Facts vs Feelings with Ryan Detrick & Sonu Varghese
This podcast takes a deep dive into the market-moving events to cut through the noise and help you identify what really matters. Facts vs Feelings is hosted by Chief Market Strategist, Ryan Detrick and VP, Global Macro Strategist, Sonu Varghese, and is a product of the Carson Investment Research Team.
The information included herein is for informational purposes and is intended for use by advisors only, and should not be copied, reproduced, or re-distributed without the consent of CWM, LLC. Carson Partners offers investment advisory services through CWM, LLC, an SEC Registered Investment Advisor. Carson Coaching and CWM, LLC are separate but affiliated companies and wholly-owned subsidiaries of Carson Group Holdings, LLC. Carson Coaching does not provide advisory services.
Facts vs Feelings with Ryan Detrick & Sonu Varghese
Rory Johnston Returns (FvF Ep. 207)
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In Episode 207 of the Facts vs Feelings podcast, Carson Group’s Ryan Detrick, Chief Market Strategist, and Sonu Varghese, Chief Macro Strategist, welcome back Rory Johnston, founder and CEO of Commodity Context, to make sense of an oil market that remains historically tight more than 200 days into the war with Iran. Rory explains why Brent sits near $108 with extreme backwardation, why roughly 13.5 million barrels a day are now moving through the Strait of Hormuz versus a pre-war normal of about 21 million, and why he calls himself a "Hormuz half-empty" kind of guy.
From there, the conversation turns to what Rory calls the "Beijing swing," as China cut net crude imports by about 5.5 million barrels a day, and to record-high diesel prices, including what a U.S. diesel export ban would mean for prices at the pump. The episode wraps with the market signals Rory watches that may indicate when the crisis is truly over: rising OECD inventories and the front of the crude curve flipping into contango.
Key Takeaways
- Brent is near $108 with prompt spreads close to $8 a barrel, signaling an acute physical deficit even though Hormuz flows have recovered to about 13.5 million barrels a day, up from near zero for non-Iranian crude in March and April.
- Rory argues Iran is gradually losing control of the strait, but the cost is enormous: Iraqi barrels have been discounted by $30 to $50, VLCC rates have hit record highs, and the war is far from over.
- China cut net crude imports by roughly 5.5 million barrels a day, and Rory believes drawdowns of strategic crude and diesel stockpiles, not just weak demand, explain much of that swing, making it inherently unsustainable.
- Diesel remains the tightest part of the market, with roughly 2 million barrels a day lost from the Middle East and Russia, U.S. exports up about 50%, and diesel cracks running at several times normal levels.
- A U.S. diesel export ban would lower domestic prices but send global diesel prices soaring and eventually force refinery run cuts. Rory expects a rationing of export licenses rather than a full ban.
- In Rory’s opinion, the clearest signal the crisis is over would be OECD inventories rising and the front of major crude curves flipping into contango, which would show the supply deficit is truly behind us.
Jump to:
0:00 — Welcome and a Family Update
2:35 — Rory Johnston Returns and Reintroduces Himself
6:40 — From $200 Oil Fear to Reality
10:45 — What Tight Backwardation Is Signaling
14:55 — Hormuz Transit Data and Dark Tankers
25:10 — China Demand Swing and the Brent WTI Gap
38:15 — Why the War Keeps Dragging On
42:10 — Diesel Shortage and Export Ban Math
47:55 — The Cleanest Signal the Crisis Ends
50:15 — Where to Follow Rory and Final Thanks
Rory Johnson is not affiliated with CWM, LLC. Opinions expressed by this individual may not be representative of CWM, LLC.
Connect with Ryan:
• LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/in/ryandetrick/
• X: https://x.com/RyanDetrick
Connect with Sonu:
• LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/in/sonu-varghese-phd/
• X: https://x.com/sonusvarghese?lang=en
Questions about the show? We’d love to hear from you! factsvsfeelings@carsongroup.com
Welcome to the Facts versus Feelings Podcast. I'm your host, Ryan D. And I'm joined by my co-host, Tony Varky. Coming through the noise, Ryan D. Chief Marco Strats. Taking out the board and helping investors focus on what really matters. And the King returns. Episode 207 of Facts versus Feelings. Ryan and Sona here as always. Rory Johnston returns. We were joking before we uh started a uh what was that? Lord of the Rings, Sony? You know me. I don't know. Lord of the Rings. Yeah.
SPEAKER_03Which my son and I are reading. I'm I'm holding up the Fellowship of the Ring book. So Rory, I don't know if you're a fan, but welcome back.
SPEAKER_01Absolutely. I'm absolutely a long, long time fan. I just read my son The Hobbit. So and he's six. So this is it was his first like real, real adult-ish book, even though it is technically a kid's book.
SPEAKER_03But anyways, yes. No, we read that last year, and my son's in the ER right now with a breathing issue. So we'll finish this and I'm back to shuttling with my, you know, exchanging roles with my wife is waiting for him. But I'm gonna take a book and read it the year, too.
SPEAKER_00So yes. Um, how do you what I mean? So we haven't really talked about it. So when I was you guys went camping and he got a virus? I mean, how is your son? I mean, really, this podcast is important, but it's not that important. Tell me he's okay.
SPEAKER_03I mean, I hope he's okay. I mean, he doesn't have our tested for he doesn't have RSV, he doesn't have COVID, he doesn't have scrap. Okay, but then it's like, as you guys know, it's the uncertainty that's you know, that's harder. If you know what it is, it's fine. Okay, 100%. He's got COVID, he's got RSV, can deal with that. I was like, what does he have, right? I think we were, you know, we camped for the first time uh together over the weekend, and this was Friday night. We're recording this on Monday, September 28th, and uh it was chilly outside, but I mean we were wrapped up and he looked fine. He went for a soccer game after that. But you know what? Yeah, I don't know if uh Rory, you have a young boy, Ryan. I know, as two of them, they power through everything, they go until they collapse, right? And this morning was a collapse.
SPEAKER_00You can never tell me.
SPEAKER_01100% I joked with you.
SPEAKER_00Sonly, did you start? Did you make a fire by yourself? That's that I that's hard to do. I mean, did you start a fire by yourself? Not quite.
SPEAKER_03I uh I was a little careful. I had a propane tank, a little bit of stove, and made some sausages and stuff like that. So helping keeping that petroleum product demand alive. Yes, yes. Speaking of, thank you for that night's segue. I guess we should get Rory's title again, right, Ryan?
SPEAKER_00Yeah, Rory. I mean, again, this is your second time, so thank you for joining us again. You joined sometime back in the spring. Um, your title and what you do all day. Let's start with that, Rory. For those people who for some reason missed the first one. I hope they didn't. We had huge downloads and views and listens. You're obviously big time, uh, and we're just looking forward to picking your brain one more time.
SPEAKER_01Yeah, so again, thank you for having me on. I think last time we were chatting, I was much more alarmed and I'll be much more retrospective and kind of backward befuddled in many ways. Uh, so let's talk through that. Uh, I'm the founder and CEO of Commodity Context. I'm an independent oil and gas analyst. I used to cover commodity economics at Scotiabank here in Toronto for the past couple of years and the entirety of both the um kind of the Hormuz crisis, another Red Sea crisis, and before that the Russia-Ukraine crisis, I've been writing independently, uh, which has allowed me a slightly freer hand to speak about these particularly political and and especially fraught moments in markets. Wow.
SPEAKER_00I mean, is there anything to talk about, you think? It's pretty calm out there, right?
SPEAKER_01Yeah, it's it's been it's been a quiet year. I've I've been really I've been trying to just refactor code and stuff like that.
SPEAKER_00Before we get there, I mean, you you you not that you weren't big before, but let's be honest, everything going on has really made your name like a household name. How many podcasts have you done this year? Do you have a ballpark like like this? How many you jumped on like this?
SPEAKER_01Uh it's been a lot. I was definitely in like March and April, I was like, there was a stretch I was probably doing five, six hours of media podcasts a day. Wow. Um, it was crazy. It was definitely the busiest I've ever been in my life. Uh is while it has no doubt been terrible for everyone, uh, it has been good for the business. So I mean it's you know, you often hear that volatility in in particular like critical markets are is not good for anyone except you know journalists and traders, and in this case, independent analysts. So um, yeah, it's been it's been wild. And I it's funny, I was I had to do like a CV for like an immigration thing. I was I was just in um in speaking in Hong Kong, which is very cool, my first time in Hong Kong. And part of that I had to do like a C V because it was like a and I saw the dim sum restaurant pictures. So good, so good. Um lots of dim sum. I think I had like Shumai like four times a day the entire time I was there. Um, but I had to do this immigration thing, and I had to like do a CV and I had like chat GBT. I'm like, pull like go back through March and April and May and like find the interviews I did, just like make a list because I have no idea. Um and it was like, and it was like the first one I would cite is early in the crisis, you did odd lots, and you said why Rory Johnston. And the title was why Rory Johnston thought oil could go to $200 a barrel. And then it's like, and then you were on again in May. Why Rory Johnston was wrong about why oil didn't go to $200 a barrel. Like, thank you. That is a that is an apt summary of my experience over the past six months. So I think that's a good way to kick off. It's like, what the heck happened?
SPEAKER_03I see. Let's stop. I I see, you know what? I want to you can get it, I'm sure you'll roll that in. Because this morning, like I said, this is September 28th, Monday, and I see this article that's going around, it's got like millions, you know, like of views saying Iran has lost control of the strait. You obviously know what I'm talking about, which one I'm talking about. And because you responded, I think you responded by saying something like, you're a Hormuz, half empty kind of guy, which was hilarious, but but I want you to walk through that. You don't have to walk through that piece, people can go find it. I want to, you know, show it. But what is the state of the oil market? Because I'm like, okay, if Iran's lost control of the straight, you think there's no problem. There's oil's flowing, but the 10-year yield is at 521, Brent is at 107 or something, whatever it is, and WT has pretty up there too. I want to talk about that as well, that spread. But go ahead, Roy. It's all you got.
SPEAKER_00No, let me do one thing. Let me do this is the makeup man. I'm gonna jump in because Rory, last time we did this, people were yelling at us on YouTube. Apparently, we jumped in front of you. So we're literally gonna be quiet for the next 40 minutes. No, no, no. It's a much better conversational. It's a joke, but no, we're gonna do better and not get in front of our speaker because Rory, people were mad. We were jumping in front of you. So take the baton, Rory, and just.
SPEAKER_01I appreciate it for what it's worth. I appreciate the conversational prompts. Uh no, we do too. I'm basically uh an oil LLM at this stage. So please prompt away. Um so let's start with like what's actually happening in the market right now. Like let's just start there. So right now, today, I'm looking at my screen. Brent, uh, you know, prompt Brent Futures are sitting at about $108 a barrel, but this is an extremely tight $100, like $108 is already high, but this is an extremely tight 108. We see prompt uh future spreads. So, like the difference between the first and second contract sitting just below $8 a barrel. The data to frontline spread, which is the spread between these, these kind of paper contracts and the physical uh dated uh dated Brent benchmark on a monthly average basis, that's sitting above $10 a barrel. These are extremely backward-aided markets, which tells us that regardless of everything else we are going to say, that at this exact moment, we still have an acute kind of gaping deficit in the oil market. And that is ebbed and flowed over time because again, everyone's always going, everyone always tries to tie this directly to Hormuz, which obviously is a big thing. Uh, but as we will talk about it in a second, Hormuz is actually flowing more oil right now. Uh, actually, the most it has, arguably, since the beginning of the war. There's a chart of yours which we can put up. Yes, and I'll let's dig into it in one second. But just on this, I think the other important thing is that the supply-demand balance also has a demand piece to it, right? That people treat it as just like if it's supply goes up, the price should go down. But this is a dynamic system and you do have demand in there as well. So we're gonna talk about both those things. But right now, crude oil specifically, and we'll get to diesel and everything else in a second, but like crude oil specifically remains very tight, and flat prices are very high. Now let's talk about hormouth because I think this piece you were mentioning that it was going over, it's doing the rounds. Well, the other thing I was tweeting this morning was like it's been fascinating. I have had the same rough methodology for tracking Hormuz transits for three, four months now. It evolved over the early months as we got used to dark transits and everything else. But for the bulk of the war, I've been using the same rough chart. Um, and this is a guy I think we can we can show the chart now. And I think this is how I track it. And to be very, very clear about what I'm what I'm looking at. I'm using data from Kepler um for the observable uh and their estimates of kind of country origin level uh shipments. So, you know, you know, what's coming from loading and and transiting from Saudi Arabia or Iraq or the UE or whatever. And then there's this other piece that I add to this, and this is what you in the chart says like GU STS, which stands for Gulf of Oman Ship to Ship Transfers. And specifically, these are orphan ship-to-ship transfers. So part of how this has ended up evolving, the biggest kind of swinging piece of this is this kind of dark shuttle operation. And essentially, essentially how it works is you take the crappier, older uh tankers you don't care quite as much about. Um let's say they were on the junkyard a couple months before the war and they've been kind of ushered back into service by the by the extremely profitable nature of this trade. Um, and these are the tankers that you don't care quite as much if they get a drone hit on them, uh, beyond the obvious like you know, death and casualty side.
SPEAKER_03These are still manned, you know, ships. Yes, they are still manned. It's not like a robot manned ship. So if they do get attacked, people go down with them.
SPEAKER_01Yes. And now most of the time there have been casualties, but most of the time these ships are attacked, it you know, uh, you know, strands the the or paralyzes the ship, doesn't typically kill the crew, uh, thankfully. Um, but in terms of like the asset itself, these assets are very, very valuable, particularly in the shipping market. Now, VLCC tanker rates, we'll talk more about in a second, have risen to all-time highs of $1.2 million a day between the uh Gulf in the Middle East and China. That's on a round-trip basis around $25 a barrel just for shipping, which is truly bananas. It's normally $2 a barrel on that same route. So we are 12-fold of what normal is. But this shuttle trade works by basically taking these crappy tankers, floating them back and forth at rapid pace, and then transloading them to other ships that are waiting in the Gulf of Oman, what I'll call like blue chip tankers. Then they will take, they're the nicer tankers. You don't want to risk you know hitting getting those hit by a missile. Um, so you take those and then float them off to China or India or Korea or whatever to do the actual deliveries. And the other one goes back and forth. These orphan ship ship transfers, this purple bar on the chart uh on the on the screen, or whenever you guys uh shared it, is essentially ship ship transfers that we know occurred, but we do not have any evidence or data on the ships that loaded them. The idea being that these were likely unobserved transits back and forth through Hormuz, because they if they're a bit of, if they've been observed, part of the challenge with this dark tanker trans is that the way you observe or identify these transits is you identify that they were in Hormuz, they were in the Gulf at one point, and they show, they disappear, and they show up on AIS, this is the tri the radar tracking, somewhere in the Indian Ocean or towards the Strait of Malacca. The problem with the dark transits is that quite frequently they never turn their AIS on. So they're back and forth, back and forth. So there's uh it's a harder way of detecting them. So this is a way of essentially detecting, getting a read on that pure shadow activity. But these numbers show that as in my latest numbers, on a seven-day rolling basis, we have around 13.5 million barrels a day flowing through Hormuz, relative to a pre-war normal of around 21 million barrels a day.
SPEAKER_02Okay.
SPEAKER_01That is a lot more. The only other time we've ever seen anywhere near this flowing through Hormuz was immediately following the MOU signing or announcement in June and July. And we saw that hump, and that was not a real loading hump. That was most of that was stranded tankers that had been stranded there for months. They were all kind of evacuated. At that stage, we saw overall flows out of Hormuz rise about 15 million barrels a day on a seven-day moving average basis. Um, but about two to two and a half of that was Iranian. Now we have 13 and a half with virtually no Iranian crude. So this is to the point, I agree with the claim that Iran is grad is currently losing control of the Strait of the Hormuz, or it's its capacity to threaten and effectively threaten the Strait of Hormuz traffic is diminishing, decaying, however you want to phrase it. I would stop by saying, because there are many people will, I've seen so many people like re like quote tweet my chart to other people being like, look, Trump's winning. And I'm like, well, I would probably stop way short of that because again, we have cruda high, you know, just below 110. We have diesel recently at all-time highs. Um, the cost of getting these 13 plus million barrels a day of oil through Hormuz are immense. This is even excluding whatever it's costing Centcom, which is an arm and a leg, to be sure. I would love to see estimates on that daily cost.
SPEAKER_03Nobody's counting that. That's okay.
SPEAKER_01Right, yeah, that's not real money. That's just taxpayer money. Um, but I think on the other side, like and the actual commercial cost. The only some of the countries that have been very successful in getting oil through Hormuz, like Iraq, for instance. We didn't think Iraq was going to be that successful because they are not typically seen as kind of state, they have lower state capacity and they don't have a national oil company like you have in Saudi Arabia or the UAE. But what they did have was desperation. And that is all that really mattered because they were offering $30 to $50 a barrel discounts for people that were willing to go in and load in Basra. And in fact, you actually have the UAE loving that ARB opportunity, based saying, like, okay, we'll actually we'll we'll ship your barrels too. The UAE was on the pioneered this dark shuttle transit system. So, all in all, it is extremely if Trump was really winning the war, if Iran clearly if Iran had no capacity threat in the strait, we would see 20 million barrels a day going through Hormuz, and the and the cost of those barrels would be in single-digit dollars, not $30 to $50 equivalent barrel. Because, you know, you've got $10 a barrel insurance, you've got shipping costs, you've got everything else, extremely expensive. So that's the current state of Hormuz. And another piece of this is that much of the most recent increase in flow has come from Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia has largely been absent in Gulf loadings. The only time they've loaded prior to this was during that post-MOU breakout period. But the thing that's pushed them back into the Gulf is that they had their critical east-west pipeline two and a half weeks ago hit by drones and missiles, uh, reportedly coming from Iranian proxies in a rock. Everyone was like, oh, it's the Houthis. But this actually appears to be a more direct Iranian attack on Saudi infrastructure that took that seven million barrel a day pipeline down. We are we've heard this morning that the pipeline is now back up and flowing at about half capacity. But still you have half that three and a half million barrels a day is now being loaded by the Saudis in the Gulf. Uh so you're all seeing this kind of diversion. Overall, you're mentioning, like, yeah, I a lot of people are like, look, Hormuz is half full again. We should be celebrating. It's like, oh, I'm really more of a Hormuz half empty kind of guy, because if you had told me, if you told any oil analyst in January that, don't worry, guys, on day 208 or whatever of the war, we have we've gotten flows through Hormuz to only less than 7 million barrels a day before. I'm like, you're literally insane. And oh, by the way, prices are only just above $100 a barrel, literal, like like bananas. Um, would have never believed you. So we'll talk about how that happened or how I think it happened, but that's the current state of play is Iran is gradually losing control. It has not lost control entirely. This is still an ongoing war, and we will see where things go from here.
SPEAKER_00So I know Sonar has a bunch of questions. A quick one for me, more for the listeners that are listening in their car um right now. You said 13 million, seven-day moving average at the lows, at the most gridlock of gridlock. What was the seven-day moving average at the bottom?
SPEAKER_01The seven-day moving average at the bottom. I mean, basically in March and April, as an example, non-Iranian flows through the strait dropped to functionally zero. Okay, so bursting. You had two million barrels a day transiting the strait, and 95% of that was Iranian crude. Um Iran was pumping that through the strait pretty regularly, right up until the imposition of the blockade, which is proven relatively effective. Like, not surprisingly, right? Like it's not a shocker that the US the US Navy can pull off a blockade of oil tankers. Those aren't shocking, particularly in like literally a known choke point. Um, but I think it you know there are debates. Um, and I think like we have seen that that has worked. Okay.
SPEAKER_03So that gets to a very connecting that, right? Back in March, April, maybe total, including Iranian crude, four to five million barrels, something like that, right? Versus 21 pre-crisis. Now you're back to 14. Yet the price of Brent back in March and April, maybe got to 115 and maximum in traded to 120. Now you're 108. We know what you just said. And so now I get the part about you just explained all the supply dynamics. I want you to go into the demand dynamics as well, but also explain why if you take a chart of Brent and WTI, there's a why it seems like that spread, there's a big jaw opening up. Yep. Why is that spread? Why is WTI not at, let's say, $103 a barrel? Why is it? I don't know what it is, 96, 97, something like that. We've got a couple of things going on.
SPEAKER_01So the first thing, and one thing I want to say, and one thing I want to follow on, just again to this piece that's that's circulating and all this chatter. The other thing I think is funny is many of these people that are now claiming that the United States has won, you know, and they're pointing this tanker traffic as proof. These same people were quote tweeting my tweets back in like April and May, being like, this guy's a loser and has no idea what he's talking about because clearly. Listen, listen, I told you I'm sorry.
SPEAKER_00I told you I'm sorry for saying that. I didn't know you then.
SPEAKER_01Brian. Um, but I think it's full of fascinating. And now all the people that like the kind of perma like the oil bowls, I use this term broadly directionally. It could be the political hacks are in here too. But I do think that like oil bulls are now pointing to oil data or like tanker data that was confirming their priors a couple months ago and now saying this is clearly corrupt. Rory has clearly been bought off by the US government. I have yet to get that invoice fulfilled personally. Um you guys are getting paid in the mail team, anyways. Um, by saying Rory's in Canada. So maybe I am in Canada. It's true, it's true. I'm I'm on the Carney Dole. Um but um all right, so how how are things higher now? The baseline is a lot of people in this market think that because the market is less loose now, prices should be falling, which is fair. I get that. But the issue is that the market has been in pretty durable and extreme deficit now for 200 plus days. That deficit has gradually the oil market is a stock and flow model. As even if even I'm not saying that we we have, because clearly markets are still prompt backwardated quite extremely. So we're not currently prompt oversupplied, but even if we were prompt oversupplied, we still have this cumulative effect of all that's oil that's been kind of consumed and drawn down in the global system. Um, that, you know, we actually need to not just flip into a surplus, we need to sit flip into a durable surplus for a long period of time for prices to really come back down again. I think at the very beginning of the war, you also had a lot more initial kind of risk perception that like the, you know, the Iranians were going to bomb East West Pipeline or Abcaque or other fields across the Middle East. That was worth something at the early at the early days, but now we have generally seen that aside from this latest attack on East West, um, overall attacks on regional upstream production infrastructure have been relatively muted. Um, this is now more of a slow grind, or this is like a big, this is like the world's biggest but normal oil market deficit now. That the market's being drawn down, things are tightening. Now, now things are working roughly how you'd expect them to be in a non kind of acute crisis scenario. But on top of that, you also talk about the demand side. The other piece of this, and the reason, the single greatest reason, people are like, oh Rory, didn't you expect the SPR releases, or didn't you expect uh the rerutes, or didn't you like, no, no, no?
SPEAKER_02Venezuela's things, right?
SPEAKER_01Venezuela, yeah, exactly. Um all of these things were not Venezuela, but everything else was expected. Um and you know, you know, OECD, uh SPR releases, largest in history, yeah, that's literally the purpose built reason they were there. East West Pipeline and AD COP reroutes, they had never been, they had never been fully maxed. We weren't sure whether or not they could be maxed without logistical constraints. Um, but in general, they worked. Um, this, you know, we knew that the infrastructure. Was there, it wasn't shocking. The thing that was far and away the biggest surprise shock in this crisis, the thing that we didn't, I didn't expect was China cutting net crude oil imports by like five and a half million barrels a day, which is in terms of scale, like basically half the unmitigated Hormuz loss right there alone. Um in terms of scale again, that is by itself roughly the amount of supply that the entirety of OPEC Plus managed to swing between 20 between 2023 and 2025. So China alone was basically able to play the demand OPEC, um, which is a staggering revelation through this crisis and opens up many, many questions of how they managed to do this, why they managed to do this. Most of what I've spent the last two months on in my life, you know, culminating with going to Hong Kong and speaking with people there to see if they had any more view. And guess what? Nope. No one there had been.
SPEAKER_03So, like, how did China do it or why? One is the economy collapsed and they needed less oil. The other is they had their own massive store of SPR, which I'd love to for you to get into. Like, do we even know how large that is? How do we confirm whether that's being released? And, you know, or it's some combination of both.
SPEAKER_01So, yeah, so I what I am calling the Beijing swing, because everything needs a nice catchy name. Um, I've written a series of, or I'm two pieces into the series now. So let's start with crude oil, the first part in the series, which is how do you explain five and a half million barrels a day of kind of reduction in crude oil swin alone? Half of that, probably just more than half of that, was outright explainable by cuts to refining runs. That we knew. Um, that we will return to, because that doesn't actually get rid of the problem, it just pushes it literally downstream. But the other side of this is largely some kind of movement of stock flows, whether, and the big debate here becomes to what degree was it a cessation of prior strategic stock building versus a fresh drawdown of, you know, unpreviously untouched strategic stocks. Because then that matters because if it's just stopping building, that's extremely sustainable and can go on forever. Whereas if you're drawing aggressively on previously built stocks, that's inherently more time limited. The big point of debate here, and frequently what you will see, um, there's a Reuters uh piece that frequently comes up along this line, and it uses a calculation, which is basically using the monthly publicly available data from the National Bureau of Statistics in China, which is crude oil production plus net imports minus refining throughput, which makes sense, right? Now, the challenge I will tell you is that none of those numbers are especially accurate, and even by China's own reconciliation, refining runs are higher, everything else. But um, that number, if you take it at face value, yields that prior to the war, basically Q4 of last year, they were building at around 1.7 million barrels a day of crude. That would be very, very bearish, uh, because that is a huge chunk of this. Sure. However, if you use that same methodology, and basically my favorite test for this stuff is okay, like, okay, let's see like how long has it been like this. Oh, that's weird. It's structurally positive forever, first of all. And going back to 2017 implies that we have that China has built more than 3 billion barrels of crude stock over this period, which is three billion barrels of crude. Which is wrong. I want to be clear. That's a wrong number, which is, I think, proof that we should begin to kind of salt this estimate considerably. The best estimate we have of total current crude inventory in China come from you know satellite uh drive data vendors, et cetera, like Kepler I use. Um, they are around, let's say, one uh going into the war, 1.2, 1.3 billion barrels in total. And over that same since 2017, has grown those reserves by around 500 million versus 3 billion. So that is your first level. That number, 1.7, is probably an overstatement. By my estimates, it's more like 500,000 barrels a day of prior stock building, which I should note is still very big and very fast. Like if any other country was building reserves of fast, like, wow, that's like a small country's normal overall oil consumption that's just going into a stock building. But the implication here is that my belief is that China has drawn down considerable SPR crude stocks over this period to fill in that crude hole to keep these refineries kind of generally whole. So that's piece one. Now let's step downstream into the refining side. Because I mentioned you had three three-ish million barrels. I think it was technically 2.7, but again, I think refining runs are higher. Uh so let's say three for nice round numbers. That's a problem because that effectively means that China's implied or apparent consumption of refined fuels dropped by 3 million barrels a day. Now, I agree, China's economy has been weak. It has not been that weak. And it's not been that sharply weak. This is a larger contraction in apparent consumption of fuel than we saw at the depths of COVID zero in 2022, that we saw in 2020, that we've seen in any prior period in China's history. Um, and at the same time, you look at indicators of end use activity in these basics of like road freight for diesel, air traffic for whatever. Road freight in China, so apparent diesel demand, which is net output of you know diesel from refineries, netted for trade, netted for known inventories, which we know a little tiny, tiny bit about, but not much. Um, that implies almost a 20% contraction in in Chinese diesel consumption by the summer. Versus road freight, which accounts for 70% of China's diesel consumption, was up three and a half percent over that same period year over year. So it's a 25% gap in apparent, right? So for me, this is indicative, not proof, but highly indicative that you have seen on top of the releases of strategic crude stockpiles, you have also seen the release of strategic product stockpiles, particularly diesel. Now, diesel of all the products is the easiest to store for a long period of time. It's not as finicky or as volatile and gassy as gasoline, not as spec specific as jet fuel or whatever. Diesel's a bit more of a room temperature, you know, room temperature stable stuff. And it's also the stuff that is most important to China, given its industrial economic tilt. But that is, I think, something that has happened has and has generally been underappreciated because we don't have official data on it and we do not have definitive proof. So you go back to whoever wants to be bearish will say, no, no, no, no, no, Ivy, you know, the can the um the real estate and construction industry contraction accounts for it all. I'm like, well, first of all, it's only 8% of end use diesel demand. So did it literally disappear overnight? Because even then it wouldn't account for it. Um, all of these things, right? And even EVs, you know, like, oh, well, there's EVs where I haven't you heard? And I'm like, well, yes, I've heard of EVs in China, kind of a big story. Um, the challenge is that while EVs or new energy vehicles are two-thirds now of China's new vehicle sales, there's still only roughly 12% of the overall vehicle fleet. So unless Beijing had like a warehouse of 400 million EVs that are just like opened Oprah style and was like released the EVs, um, that was that would like that's the only way that you could have had an actual like month-on-month swing like that. I'm picturing Djing being like Oprah, like you get an EV, you get an EV. Exactly, exactly. Um, unless it happened, which again, I think we probably would have read about in Bloomberg or something, um, because it would have been a great story, didn't happen. So, again, that we can explain overall levels and trends, but the pace at which that contracted doesn't make sense with any other available data. Now, EV growth in China is insane. Like this year, probably on track to displace upwards of a half a million barrels a day, year over year on average, in road fuels this year. That is going to be a major issue for oil bulls next year, like undoubtedly. Um, even in a couple years, China will have largely displaced the entire amount of the Beijing swing um durably. Wow. But just not this year, right? And I think that's a different question of like what we're explaining today. So, how this gets back to the price and the demand side implications is if China has drawn down these fuel stocks, this tells us it's inherently unsustainable. We have started seeing a faster reduction in commercial crude stocks, the ones we can see. So we know they're drawing crude stocks faster. The final piece I'll say this, and another reason why I think we should be very suspicious of these claims of like mass uh you know demand destruction in China. One of the main reasons that Chinese refineries reduced runs so much is that their margins collapsed because China held the domestic fuel prices much lower than international levels. They capped them. So, in terms of, let's say, the Beijing guided price for diesel, which is essentially the cap for diesel prices in the region, those were at their peak up around 30% versus the beginning of the world, versus global prices, which doubled. Um, so if we can explain, I can explain weaker diesel demand, for instance, in the United States, because prices are at all-time highs. You know, US average diesel prices are now above $6.50 a gallon. I can explain demand destruction there. I can't explain, I you know, it's unreasonable to say that China is seeing the largest contraction in diesel demand in its history with prices that we saw back easily, back a couple years ago. Um, it just doesn't make sense. So, and then but that tapping has essentially it forced Beijing to also like cat, you know, block exports. Because if they left the export window open, you just would have basically let all of this arb out of the Chinese economy and made all of these domestic systems that much harder to maintain. But yeah, I would say that like we can talk about anything for the rest of the hour, but I think like China alone could dominate a full day of discussion because I think it's that important and still that misunderstood. And I spent two months on it and I still don't understand it totally.
SPEAKER_00So I just look, the war started 212 days ago. Hey Gala. Um, you know, we we we spoke within the first month, I think, when all this started, when you joined us. I mean, how surprised are you this is still going? You know, I'm not necessarily about the oil, but just the war. Like, like honestly, like I am. I mean, I just thought it's it's a midterm year. There's an election right around the corner. Like, we kind of thought, but then you hear the headlines, and I get it. By the time people listen to this, it might be different. Headlines are well, we're gonna keep bombing them after the midterms now. You know, that could just be hard talk, yes. But I mean, I'm very surprised. This is seemingly still going strong. What's your take, Rory?
SPEAKER_01I completely agree. Um, I would have, I would have bet so heavily against it. And if it was going on this long, I would have said, like, oh, like $200 would have been my my estimate for the summer if this was still going on. And that was obviously wrong. So, like, we would have been well into like heady territory by now. But clearly that's not what happened. I think a big piece of that is the China piece. Um, but I think and I think that then you go to the question of like why, because I think that dovetails a little bit into this of like why China did this. I think the most reasonable theory is like domestic economy is weak. They need export markets. So they don't want the rest of the world, particularly Asia and Europe, the two areas that were trying to diversify trade during the trade war. They didn't want those export hubs to or export sinks to kind of fall into recession or like depression. Uh that would have been very, very bad for Chinese business. But I think that's a the most euphemistic um kind of explanation. I think another one is like just pure energy security. Uh, we can get to that one. But there is a theory that I find like fun, which is initially I thought that China wouldn't do much because I why would they bail out Donald Trump uh in a trade war with him? And why would they lessen the market force on him to end this quickly? Because I thought how it was going to end was we're gonna get $200 crude and Trump was gonna taco. That was a pro that was my predictable outcome. Didn't happen. And again, China's been peaceful. So the the other theory is like, what if this was part of Beijing's plan? You know, that like what instead of the hot wall, you know, the frog in the hot water, let's keep the water in like a lukewarm simmer and keep American Empire, you know, distracted and contained in this kind of quagmire in the Middle East in the most cliche of ways. Um, which again, I think is like Lord of the Rings by chance.
SPEAKER_00Sonu, was that a Lord of the Rings ploy? Because that's pretty devious. I mean, that's pretty devious.
SPEAKER_03I mean, Occam's razor, I like the explanation you just laid out, which is that they were basically, I mean, not in as clear terms, maybe, but if effectively it amounted to the same thing, they were bailing out their immediate South Asian, Southeast Asian trading partners. Oh, okay. That makes total sense to me. Yeah, right. I mean, I mean, yes, maybe a nice side effect is that America's in this quag barrier, that's fine. Because otherwise, yeah, it would be, you know, that then he gets a three and four and five-dimensional chess, and right. But going to so what I'm I'm trying to think about this. Would it have been better in a way if we did go to $200 a barrel of oil? We got demand destruction. The problem is solved somehow. I don't know how. I always thought there is no military solution to reopening or a diplomatic solution, but you know, who knows? I have no, I'm not a geopolitical expert, right? Rather than, so would it have been better if we went to $200 in oil, demand destruction across the world, including the United States, instead of the slow burn, the sustained, you know, four and a half dollar gallon per gallon gasoline, 5.6, $5.60, 70 cents, diesel, all-time records, and we are just slowly grinding and getting sucked, the the air sucked out of us.
SPEAKER_01I mean, in terms of the economic effects, probably. Um, I think the question would have been if that $200 barrel kind of spike point would have pushed the White House to concede faster. You know, if not, we would just would have been in this for a longer period of time. Um again, I think that in some ways, you see like the secretary, like uh like Secretary Bessent like retweeting people on Twitter being like, oh, oil price, you know, Hormuz is losing control of the strait, or you know, there's high transit or whatever. There's a lot of confirmation bias at play here. And these principles already know what they want to do. They're just looking for justification to do it. At this stage, I think many people in the White House would have wanted this to be done. I think we've at this stage been pretty clear that like Trump doesn't want to just concede. He wants to get something out of it. And now there's so much of this bad faith between both sides. How are you ever going to get to a stage? Um, and again, I think like I've been saying for a while, like the you know, two of the most historically kind of like uh notorious bad faith negotiators in history between Donald J. Trump and the Islamic Republic of Iran, like like made like a like a like a like a mash made in hell, honestly. And I think that is like I think like if you were just to look back and say, if you were to say, like, it's been months and there's been false starts, but like everyone lies and cheats and gets their feelings hurt and bombs something, you're like, yeah, okay, I could I could see that happening. Like that seems entirely reasonable. I just would have thought there would have been more of a material forcing effect to like again. I thought Trump would have cared more about the midterms, and apparently he doesn't. Um, maybe at this last second we'll get some kind of Hail Mary on diesel bans, which I think we should talk about. I was just gonna ask. That was my next question because excellent, excellent segue. I think like they're gonna want to do something, but clearly they haven't done anything nearly enough, nearly quickly enough to have for it to really matter for voters' kind of pocketbooks.
SPEAKER_03So let's talk about diesel. Uh I think Ryan, we have about 10 minutes thereabouts, something like that. Let's talk about diesel because that's clearly hurting.
SPEAKER_00Yeah, I'd say we get the 10-minute warning. Amazing how fast this goes.
SPEAKER_03So if diesel's clearly hurting here, right? I don't know if you're getting demand destruction, probably not yet, because you know, you look at all the non-residential business investment activity, it's just going gangbusters. Look at EMIs, services, manufacturing, look at durable goods, new orders. Presumably, a lot of this stuff needs diesel to transport things across the country with freight. So there's no slowdown in that activity. So there's no demand, I'm safe to say there's no demand destruction. And I don't want to prognosticate like where we get that, but what's happening with diesel right now? And will a diesel export ban help?
unknownYeah.
SPEAKER_01So diesel is, I mean, if the if the oil market is tight, diesel market is ragingly so, and increasingly is not even just viewed as a short-term thing anymore. Like this is a structural issue in the diesel market going forward as the market is pricing it. Um, the first big hit was obviously Hormuz itself, of that 21 million barrels that crossed Hormuz, five to six million barrels a day of that was product. And let's say a million barrels a day of that was diesel, or maybe just over a million barrels a day. Still today, we are down just shy of um a million barrels a day of diesel exports from the Middle East to the world, both between Hormuz and the recent attacks in the Red Sea have also taken off uh refinery export uh supply there as well. And on top of that, you've also had the massive step up in Ukrainian force attacks against Russian refineries, which is at various points throttled upwards of half of Russia's refinery fleet. Russia is typically in a not, and not this year, is the second largest exporter of diesel and gas oil in the market, or a million barrels a day. So in total, between those two, we've lost roughly around two million barrels a day of diesel to the market. What's the largest? Is the US the largest? US is the largest, and now is even more the largest. So during this period, the only the only place that you've seen exports increase is from the United States, which they've risen by about 50% to around a million and a half barrels a day. Now you're seeing discussion of banning that.
SPEAKER_03And that's the free market at work, right? Because you'd be like, if US diesel producers say, you know what, these guys up abroad are going to, you know, I can charge them an arm and leg, why wouldn't I do that?
SPEAKER_01Absolutely. And I think like right now you're seeing diesel, uh, sorry, uh US refinery run rates extremely high for this time of year. Normally they would be dipping into seasonal maintenance. Your refinery is printing gold bricks right now. Like anyone that has a refinery that's working, you're going to work it as long as hard as you can because you're making for every month, like each month you're working this right now, you're getting half a year's worth of prior earnings. Wow, is kind of like diesel crack spreads is an example, where they're down very recently, but recently in like mid-mid-September, they were at $115 a barrel for diesel cracks versus Brent in the United States. That is up from a normal level. Uh, let's say, let's say pre-2022, because like a normal, like pre-normal was like $20 a barrel. So you're like 6x that normal level. Um, these things are printing money. Um and I think the basic, and so yeah, you just have like massive export arbitrage opportunities, and you have see overall refinery run rates in the United States held higher by that export bid. Um, the the what would happen if you had a diesel export ban? First, global XUS diesel markets would just go haywire. Like we were already at such a crazy, the steepest part of like the pricing curve that even modest losses or gains can move prices as we've seen, like $30 a barrel. Right now, we are actually sitting at around $90 a barrel for diesel cracks, way down from our recent highs, but still like triple or quadruple or quintuple, what our normal levels would be. Um, but you've seen a lot of volatility because in this kind of level of the curve, that's a level like the kind of inventory or supply to price relationship, you just have such massive volatility there. Now, I think that's indicative because let's say you lost, like you could you could have the diesel diesel cruck right now if you added half a million barrels a day of diesel supply to the market. Let's say if China increased exports, which could still happen. Um, but let's say you lost a million and a half barrels a day of US diesel. Like the market would just skyrocket. Like you could see $150, $200 barrels. This is outside the US outside the United States. Now, the effect on the United States is predictably, given what we're talking about and the point of this for the midterms, is that it would put downward pressure on US diesel prices. And essentially, Republicans can presumably hold cancers in Iowa Senate seats or something like that. Exactly, right? And I think exactly. So the idea is that US is normally a structural exporter of diesel. If you cut off that access to export markets, you start building domestic inventories. Domestic inventories are very, very low right now, so you have some space, but you put gradual downward, downward, downward pressure. I saw an estimate earlier today that estimated that you could see upwards of a 25 cent a gallon reduction in diesel prices per week. The diesel, and I think I haven't run the numbers, but that seems reasonable on the scale to me. Correct. So in five weeks, he could be back down to 450 a gallon for diesel. Yeah. And but and here's the thing, but given how everything is everything else in the market, eventually that's gonna keep happening until diesel margins effectively drop to negative levels in the United States. And you eventually have to cut refining runs to balance that market. And you can't just stop producing diesel, you're gonna stop producing gasoline and jet fuel and everything else. So you will actually tighten all the rest of the markets, and both coasts still import these fuels from the rest of the world. So if you're tightening the rest of the world's markets, you're gonna import that inflation back through the coasts on the east and west as well. So it'll be great temporarily for the US Gulf Coast, unless you're employed in the oil market or a refinery. Um, it's great for motorists, but there's been huge pushback, and now there's been this big debate. I think very likely. You won't see a full straight-up ban. You will see some kind of pro-rata rationing of export licenses. You saw this during 73, 74 with Nixon. He basically throttled that gasoline. I would expect a similar thing to happen. Now, say instead of cutting a million and a half barrels a day, let's say you cut back to pre-war levels. So you let's say you cut out that extra 500,000. So you're back to a million. I think that's probably what's going to happen. So the same logic I talked about plays out, but at a much slower level in that, in that case.
SPEAKER_03That makes sense to me because, you know, I imagine the American energy industries, guys, do not do the diesel ban. Because they want to obviously make money too. And then if they there is a diesel ban, they'd be like, you know, screw it. We're not producing more. We're not refining this.
SPEAKER_00Well, and eventually you get to a place where the things are really tight.
SPEAKER_01In some ways, they need an excuse to you to do maintenance. So in some ways, it'd actually be a blessing in disguise for a very, very particular group of refiners. But no, like the American Petroleum Institute uh Institute and various other industry associations have come out heavy. And normally these groups are not that political and will refrain from kind of saying like the White House is making the wrong decision or is thinking about the wrong decision. But they've come up pretty squarely, like this is a terrible idea.
SPEAKER_00Wow. So, Roy, it's incredible how fast this goes. Episode 207, Roy Johnston returns. Tell us a little bit about commodity context. Um, out for the listeners out there, what what what you produce every day, every week, um, how your average investor might enjoy it, who you're really trying to sell your products to.
SPEAKER_01Yeah. So again, thanks for having me on, guys. Um, commodity context is my view of how I kind of look at the oil market. In terms of the actual product, we publish typically two pieces a week. Uh, an oil the oil context weekly report every Friday at end of business, basically after the commitments or trader report comes out. So we have nice fresh data on kind of oil market and major product positioning. Then we have three data decks, which are monthly kind of data roundups, big chart packs, uh, forecast, you know, uh, you know, re-estimates of product level demand, supply, everything else. And then we have thematic research, which recently has been very heavy, very heavy tilted towards China. Before that was very heavily tilted towards Moose, before that was Venezuela, very much kind of following whatever the fun thing to look at that day is and what people want more information about. In terms of my like methodology and my, you know, my philosophy for it, it's data driven, it's visualization forward. I like charts, I like putting data together. As I was saying earlier, like I've seen the revolving door of people who repost my charts one day and then call me a paid-for liar the next day. The charts and the methodology stays the same. You can choose whether or not to believe it on that given day. But that's really what I'm offering is again, no one's purely independent, but like I no longer, you know, have institutional kind of high-level bank relationships to worry about or politics to worry about in the same way. So I feel like I can be a little bit more even-handed uh than I think some of the other people with more institutional constraints. So that's kind of what I'm offering. And I encourage you to check me out at commoditycontext.com.
SPEAKER_00One more from me, then Sono. You can probably finish it with the last question. Um, just say thanks all the listeners out there. We've had a huge amount of downloads and listens on the YouTube channel. If you like this podcast, especially with Rory, this has been awesome. Please share it with friends. Give us a like, give us a file, follow. Positive review and negative reviews are welcome. We cannot lead the witness, but I have a theory on which one we'd prefer everyone to give us. And YouTube comments are good. Honestly, Sona, we should have cut Rory off non-stop because we probably would have got way more YouTube comments. We did so much better at not cutting Rory off. We had so many comments last time. Maybe comment that. You guys did so much better than last time Rory's gonna be able to do that.
SPEAKER_03I'm sure there'll be one or two comments saying we still cut, you know, Rory off one too many times. We did better.
SPEAKER_00I mean, Sonar and I do this. Rory, we Sonar does all the time. We cut each other off non-stop. People are just used to it. When we have a guest like you, I think they just want us to get out of the way. But Rory, this was awesome. Uh thank you as always. Sonu, last question for Rory, because we do need to wrap up episode one or two oh six. Go ahead, Sonu.
SPEAKER_03I was trying to think how to end this. Maybe this question is what is the best market signal? Because we follow markets here, and price is always right until it isn't, right? What is the best sign that the crisis is well and truly over? Is it oil at $70 a barrel? And now I'll put an asterisk on that because we got to that in July.
SPEAKER_01Yeah.
SPEAKER_03And clearly the crisis is not over. What's a market signal that the crisis is over? Part of it maybe Shanghai crude or something, right? Something I've started to start at tracking, thanks to your research. But what would you be looking for?
SPEAKER_01I'm a simple man and I really look at two things beyond anything else, which is your visible, confirmable, like OECD inventory levels. If those start rising again in a real way, real supply is making it into the system, it's not being immediately consumed. That, however, is going to necessarily be lagged. So if you want a the truest, hardest of fake signal in the market would be the front of all the major crude curves flipping into Catango. Right now, I mentioned we are at nearly $8 a barrel backwardated. Normally we measure backwardation and the prompt contract in like cents per barrel, and we were at $8 a barrel right now. So that is extremely, extremely tight. What you would expect to see as flows normalize, as everything begins to work itself out, that would fall back down to the single digits and to the cents, and then would gradually flip into Contango, which is your incentive to basically build these stocks. True, but the market needs to actually pay for that stock rebuild in many ways, which means we need Cantango. The only way we're gonna see this really done is we need a protracted period of Contango to rebuild stocks and prove that the supply deficit's really behind us.
SPEAKER_00All right. Wow, fantastic. Well said. Um, in 30 seconds, how's the barbecue life treating you, Roy? We talked about a barbecue last time. Well, how's that treating you?
SPEAKER_01Good. Did say did three racks of ribs. And the first time I had a I had a vegetarian uh joining us, and I had never done like something like a primary item on the barbecue. I did like a full head of cauliflower that I like dressed up and seasoned like ribs and smoked it for a couple hours. It was delicious. Um it was fantastic. I had leftover ribs with my scrambled eggs this morning.
SPEAKER_00That sounds good. Yeah, that's awesome. Well, listen, Roy, this was amazing. Roy Johnston returns, episode 206. Um, you know, hopefully we have you back next year sometime, and I'm sure there's gonna be something to talk about then. Maybe we got some good news to talk about then with some of the stuff in the middle of the room. We have with the return of the glut. Yeah, we we will see. But um, listen, Roy, thanks a lot. All listeners, thank you. Everybody, this one's in the book. Stone and I will be back next week. Take care, everybody. Thank you. Goodbye. Information provided on facts versus feelings with some of our geeks and Ryan Dietrich are for general information only and are not intended to provide specific advice or recommendations for any individual. The statements and opinions of show guests may not be reflective of CWM LLC or its affiliates. Past performance is no guarantee of future results. All indices are unmanaged and may not be invested in directly. Investing involves risk, including possible loss of principal. No strategy assures success or protects against loss. To determine what may be appropriate for you, consult with your attorney, accountant, financial, or tax advisor prior to investing. Guests on facts versus feelings are not affiliated with CWM L L C
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